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It might seem an inapposite time to pose the questionas to whether the relationship between the judicial andexecutive branches of government should be
characterised as a new partnership. Much press and other
comment would have suggested that the informed observer
should have asked me to entitle this lecture: “The new
confrontation?” However, what I seek to do is to examine
how the relationship between the two branches of
government is to operate once the changes consequent
upon the reform of the office of Lord Chancellor have
come into effect. This is of particular importance to the
way in which justice is administered – a subject of acute
political and media debate and significant public interest,
though not yet perhaps the subject of sufficient academic
study.
Prior to the decision announced in June 2003 to reform
the office of Lord Chancellor, the closeness of the
relationship between the executive and the judiciary was
embodied in the position of Lord Chancellor. He was and
remains until April 2006, the head of the judiciary as well
as being a senior member of the executive. With the
decision that he should cease to be a judge and therefore
the head of the judiciary came the need to find a new way
of providing a framework for the relationship.
One of the essential purposes of the Concordat between
the judiciary and the government made in January 2004
was to guarantee the continued independence of the
judiciary. Another was to continue the benefits that it was
perceived had been the result of that relationship. The
second of these, the subject here, was recognised by the
Lord Chancellor in his statement to the House of Lords on
January 26, 2004 when announcing his agreement on the
Concordat with the judiciary. He described the Concordat
as being necessary to sustain and entrench “the successful
partnership between the judiciary and his department”; its
purpose was to bring clarity and transparency to that
relationship and to see that it was enshrined in the
forthcoming Constitutional Reform Bill. In his response,
Lord Woolf referred to “a close working relationship”
which was “a special quality of our justice system which, in
the interests of the public, it is important to preserve”.
When enacted some 15 months later, the Constitutional
Reform Act embodied many of the provisions of the
Concordat.
The question as to whether there was a need for that
change may be long debated. I believe the change was
inevitable. Time will recognise that the reform was one of
the substantial constitutional achievements of modern
times. That question, however, is quite different to that
which I propose to consider here, as that question involves
looking backwards. As we are now less than five months
away from the start of the new relationship, I intend to
look forward and examine the new relationship and
consider how it should be characterised.
The new relationship is premised, of course, on the
recognition by the executive and Parliament of the
independence of the judiciary. This is guaranteed by the
Constitutional Reform Act
1
and the Lord Chancellor and
other ministers are placed under an obligation to uphold
that independence.
Given that fundamental premise, there are, it seems to
me, three essential conditions to the new relationship.
Each of these three conditions is consequent upon the
change in the position of the Lord Chancellor. The first is
a pre-condition – a structure for governance of the
judiciary capable of discharging the responsibilities vested
or transferred to the judiciary. If this is met, then the
relationship depends upon:
• Clarity in the respective functions of the judiciary and
the executive
• Constructive engagement premised upon an
understanding of and respect for those functions
The character of the new relationship between the
judiciary and the executive will depend on the extent to
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which each can be achieved. Much has been done over the
past 18 months, as inevitably there is a need to be ready for
the operation of the new system. It is therefore possible to
reach some tentative conclusions.
THE STRUCTURE FOR THE GOVERNANCE
OF THE JUDICIARY
It is convenient first to deal with the structure of
governance the judiciary has adopted to enable it to
discharge the new responsibilities.
The Constitutional Reform Act makes the Lord Chief
Justice President of all the Courts of England and Wales
and Head of the Judiciary of England and Wales; in almost
every section and every paragraph, the power transferred
from the Lord Chancellor or declared by the Act is vested
in the Lord Chief Justice. However, it was never intended
that the Lord Chief Justice should exercise all these powers
and functions personally; this would, as some feared, have
transformed him into a judge who never had time to sit2.
The purpose was simply to enable the powers to be
delegated in a manner that would fit in with detailed
arrangements which it was obvious would have to be
created, allowing the Lord Chief Justice to perform his
primary responsibility of sitting in important cases in both
divisions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and
giving leading judgments. He is and must, above all, be a
judge sitting in the courts, as that is essential to his
authority and constitutional legitimacy.
Nor was it intended that he exercise the functions and
powers entrusted and declared without an internal
collegiate structure. Just as the purpose of the Concordat
was to make clear and transparent, at a high level, the
relationship between the judiciary and the executive, the
way in which the judiciary was to be organised and the
functions and powers of the Lord Chief Justice were to be
exercised required more clarity and transparency in that
structure. This is now being achieved through the new
internal arrangements.
At the heart of the new internal arrangements are the
Judicial executive Board, the Judges’ Council and the
Judicial Office of England and Wales; each has its origins in
the way in which the judiciary was governed; only one of
them has a long history.
The Judicial Executive Board
The Judicial Executive Board has its origins in the
informal committee of senior judges known as the Heads
of Division meetings; meetings of the Lord Chief Justice
and the then three Heads of Division3 were expanded
gradually over the years to include a further six judges
including the Deputy Chief Justice, the Vice-President of
the Queen’s Bench Division, the Deputy Heads of Family
and Civil Justice, the judge in charge of modernisation and
the Senior Presiding Judge4. These meetings took place as
occasion demanded and played an important role in
dealing with internal issues (such as security at the RCJ,
filming court proceedings and orders restricting the
reporting of proceedings), issues relating to the executive
(such as the appointments process and IT), appointments
to the High Court and Court of Appeal and occasional one
off issues. Meetings with the Lord Chancellor were on a
regular basis5; one of the topics that was covered with him
at these meetings was advice on appointments to the High
Court6.
The Judicial Executive Board is a smaller body and more
formally structured. Its membership (as presently
constituted) is seven judges – the Lord Chief Justice, the
Heads of Division7, the Vice-President of the Queen’s
Bench Division and the Senior Presiding Judge; it meets
monthly with a set agenda and forward programme. It is
constituted and intended to operate as a board rather than
an informal committee.
Its core function is to enable the Lord Chief Justice to
make policy and general executive decisions through it.
More specifically its objectives include developing policy
and practice on judicial deployment, appointment to non
judicial roles and general appointments policy, putting
forward the requirements for new appointments of High
Court Judges and Lords Justice of Appeal and holding
discussions on specific appointments with the Judicial
Appointments Commission and the Lord Chancellor,
managing the judiciary’s overall relationship with the
executive branch of Government and Parliament,
approving the annual budget for the Judicial Office and
approving the agreement with the Permanent Secretary of
the Department of Constitutional Affairs on resources for
that office.
Apart from the issues relating to the judiciary in general,
issues arise that are specific to each of the jurisdictions. It
is neither necessary nor practicable for the Judicial
Executive Board to deal with these, as legislative change has
created Heads of the three jurisdictions. The first to be
created in point of time was the Head of Civil Justice – the
result of the proposals for civil justice put forward as part
of what have been known worldwide as the “Woolf
Reforms”8. The Constitutional Reform Act completed the
process by creating the posts of Head of Criminal Justice
and Head of Family Justice9. Issues relating to jurisdiction
are the responsibility of the Heads of Civil, Criminal and
Family Justice through sub-committees of the Judicial
Executive Board10.
What may be described as the fourth area of jurisdiction
– the tribunals – of necessity requires a more complex
provision which is in the process of evolution. This is partly
because the Constitutional Reform Act dealt primarily, save
as to appointments, with the position of the courts, partly
because the reforms envisaged by the Leggatt Report are
still in the process of being carried into effect, and partly
because the jurisdiction of some tribunals extends to
Scotland and Northern Ireland. The tribunals are4
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represented on the Judges’ Council and the relationship to
the Judicial Executive Board is being developed.
The Judges’ Council
The Judges’ Council has a much more ancient pedigree,
but in its modern composition and structure dates from
200211. It is a body broadly representative of the judiciary
as a whole. Over the very short period since 2002, the
Council has played an important role in providing a forum
for the judiciary to discuss and resolve issues of policy,
including a significant role in relation to the making of the
Concordat. Its working parties have played an important
role in the relations with the executive in areas such as the
provision of adequate resources for the courts, the
promulgation of a code on judicial conduct and the
formulation of policy on judicial welfare and career
development. Clearly its precise role in the new settlement
and its relationship to the Judicial Executive Board needs
clarification – particularly a clearer definition of those areas
where the Judicial Executive Board and the Council
respectively have policy and decision making functions. A
working party chaired by Neuberger LJ is examining these
at present.
The Judicial Office of England and Wales
The assumption of these and other functions to which I
will refer would not have been possible without the
creation of the Judicial Office of England and Wales. This
has its origins in the very small private offices of the Lord
Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and President of the
Family Division. Again I do not want to look back and
consider why in the past so little by way of support was
provided to the judiciary. What is important is that the
Concordat recognised the need for the creation of a proper
office to support the judicial branch of government in the
functions it had to discharge. Its head is a senior civil
servant at Director level. The Office is being structured
under the Director to mirror the responsibilities being
assumed, subject to the resources agreed with the
Permanent Secretary of the Department of Constitutional
Affairs. It includes a communications office, the
responsibility of which extends to the media and
communication with the judiciary in its widest sense.
The circuits
Although these three bodies are, as I have said, at the
heart of the new internal arrangements, it has also been
necessary to provide for what happens outside London on
the circuits. Again what is being done to accommodate the
change builds on what is already in place. When as a result
of the report of the Beeching Commission in 196912, the
then Lord Chancellor’s Department established a unified
court service for all courts other than the Magistrates and
House of Lords, two High Court Judges were then
appointed on each circuit to “be responsible for a general
oversight of the administration, and in particular for the
location and well being of the judges in the circuit”13; their
responsibilities were to include supervision of the running
of the courts, taking action to prevent delay and deploying
the judiciary as needed on the circuit. These judges, known
as the Presiding Judges, have had since that time an overall
responsibility in respect of the judiciary on the circuit and
the business of the courts; the posts of Family Division
Liaison Judges and Chancery Supervising Judges were
created to take more specific responsibility for family and
chancery jurisdictions, so when I refer to Presiding Judges
hereafter, I include within that term the Family and
Chancery Judges with these specific responsibilities.
The most important function which is to be dealt with
on the circuits by the Presiding Judges is the Lord Chief
Justice’s responsibility for the conduct of the business of
the courts; in this and their other functions the Presiding
Judges are to be supported by newly created Circuit
Judicial Secretariats on each circuit. It is more convenient
to consider the conduct of the business of the courts in the
context of the other conditions on which the relationship
with the executive depends.
The other functions
There are several other important functions which have
to be carried out on a day to day basis. There is, for
example, the responsibility for training which is to
continue to be vested in the Judicial Studies Board. In
addition, there are other significant functions including
those in relation to appointments through the Judicial
Appointments Commission, appointments to other posts
such as Presiding Judges and Resident Judges, complaints
and discipline and overseas relations. These are to be
handled through the Judicial Office or by individual judges
supported by the Judicial Office.
Conclusion on the establishment of a structure for
the judiciary
This is only a brief summary, but I hope I have
sufficiently outlined the structure for the governance of the
judiciary which enable the responsibilities vested in the
Lord Chief Justice as Head of the Judiciary to be
discharged. That necessary pre-condition to the
relationship is, I believe, therefore being fulfilled.
I therefore turn to the other conditions necessary for
the operation of the new relationship.
THE OPERATION OF THE NEW
RELATIONSHIP
It is axiomatic that it is the primary function of each
judge to try and determine the case before the court
applying the law as determined by Parliament. In respect of
that function, the examination of the relationship with the
executive and Parliament depends upon an examination of
the scope of the judiciary’s approach to legislative
interpretation and the development of the common law. 5





Clarity in that area is a topic which has been frequently
examined; it is the subject of much jurisprudence which
has most recently and most clearly been considered by
Lord Bingham in the 2005 Maccabean Lecture: The Judges:
Active or Passive. Difference of opinion and difficulty in
defining the respective roles of the judiciary and executive
and the tension between them could be said to be
endemic. The Concordat and the Constitutional Reform
Act have effected no change; I do not intend to visit that
topic.
What I wish to do is to examine the new relationship
necessitated by the reform by taking three topics where
there is very much less by way of jurisprudence – (1) the
conduct of the business of the courts; (2) appointments,
complaints and discipline; and (3) the making of legislative
and executive policy. In each, I shall examine the extent to
which the two further conditions to which I have referred
can be achieved and the character of the new relationship
defined. But first I must say a little more about the two
conditions.
(a) Clarity in the respective functions of the judiciary
and the executive
Until the decision to reform the office of Lord
Chancellor, it was not generally necessary to have any real
clarity as to what was done by the Lord Chancellor as a
judge and head of the judiciary in relation to the proper
functioning of the court and judicial system and what was
done by him as a member of the executive. However, once
the decision was made that he would no longer be a judge
and the Lord Chief Justice was to be Head of the Judiciary
of England and Wales, it became necessary to have greater
precision as what functions under our constitution are for
the judiciary and what are for the executive. The
Concordat and the Constitutional Reform Act have sought
to set a framework for this so that the executive and the
judiciary can work closely together to ensure the proper
functioning of the court and judicial system. This
framework covered relatively high level functions. Work
has been and continues to be necessary to bring clarity and
transparency to many other functions.
(b) Constructive engagement premised upon an
understanding of and respect for those functions
There has for a considerable time been constructive
engagement between the judiciary and the executive; the
intensity of that engagement has varied over time. It was
sometimes referred to as a partnership, as, for example, by
Lord MacKay of Clashfern in the 1991 Mischon Lecture.
But that engagement has hitherto always been conducted
in the context of the special position of the Lord
Chancellor as a judge and a member of the executive; his
officials were his representative in both capacities. Indeed
in several respects it was not necessary for the judiciary to
engage, as this could be done for them by or on behalf of
the Lord Chancellor. With the reform of that office:
• First, there was the need in some fields to create a
framework for engagement.
• Second, there has been, I have found, a need for greater
intensity in the engagement, partly because the
judiciary are more formally a separate part of
government and partly because engagement is
perceived to be essential.
• Third, it has become clear that engagement can only
take place constructively if, on the one hand, it does
not compromise the independence of the judiciary
and, on the other, the judiciary do not become involved
in political controversy.
• Fourth, it is essential that the relationship is premised
upon an understanding and respect for the differing
functions of the judiciary and the executive; self
restraint is a useful watchword.
Mechanisms for resolving tensions
There is another issue – mechanisms for resolving
tensions. It may at some levels (particularly at local level)
be a fourth condition on which the relationship at that level
depends. As head of the judiciary and a minister, it was
always possible for the Lord Chancellor to resolve tensions,
particularly if they arose between judges and the
administration for which he was responsible. The
relationship between the judiciary and the executive
extends, as I will endeavour to show, to engagement at
different levels, including very local levels; experience
shows that tensions are bound to arise at those levels.
There have to be therefore ways of resolving those tensions
at those levels. I turn next to the three topics which I wish
to examine.
THE CONDUCT OF THE BUSINESS OF THE
COURTS
I will begin with the conduct of the business of the
courts. I will deal with it at much greater length than the
other two topics, as it is by far the most important topic
and much more has been finalised. Indeed it is difficult to
underestimate the importance to litigants of ensuring that
all cases are brought before the court as quickly and
cheaply as possible as is consistent with the just
determination of the case. Much of what I want to address
is in the public domain, but it is neither easy to find nor
well known.
The development of the responsibility of the judiciary
for the conduct of the business of the courts developed in
two stages. First, although in some jurisdictions, such as
the Commercial Court, it had been long recognised that
the judges had a responsibility for the definition of the
essential issues in a case before the trial, it was not until the
1990s that there was a more general recognition of the
responsibility of the judiciary for case management and not
until 2004 that it was generally introduced into criminal6
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cases14. Responsibility for case management may broadly be
defined as managing each particular case before the court
and bringing that particular case to trial in a speedy, cost
effective and just manner. The second stage was the logical
consequence of the first. The ability to bring each
particular case to trial swiftly and economically depends on
the efficient management by the judiciary of all the cases
before the particular court and the assignment of each case
to the right judge. It was only in 2004, about 25 years after
the establishment of the Judicial Studies Board, that it was
recognised that training in such overall management was
essential and management courses were inaugurated.
In giving the first of these annual lectures in 1998, Lord
McKay of Clashfern, expressed the view that it was
essential that the judiciary should be in control of the
courts and that the judiciary should have security of tenure:
“The solution to this is to have the head of the judiciary the
only judge without security of tenure, a member of the
executive and accountable to Parliament as such. The unique
solution is, to my mind, most valuable and notwithstanding
the weighty opinions to the contrary, I hope it will long be
retained.”
There can be no dispute about Lord MacKay’s
proposition that that the judiciary must be in control of the
courts; control of the courts and in particular the conduct
of the business of the courts is an integral part of the
independence of the judicial system. The responsibility for
this will be formally vested in the Lord Chief Justice, as
President of the Courts and Head of the Judiciary of
England and Wales, and delegated by him.
However, this responsibility cannot be discharged in
isolation. Its proper discharge depends on the
interrelationship between (a) the provision and
prioritisation of resources by the executive (b) the
functioning of the administrative infrastructure, (c) the
careful deployment of the judges and the assignment of
cases to them and (d) the relations with other organs of the
executive which play a role in the administration of justice,
particularly criminal justice.
(a) The provision and prioritisation of resources
In most systems it is the responsibility of the other
branches of government to provide the resources for the
courts and judicial system; in some it is directly provided
by the legislature, in others through the executive15. In
England and Wales the responsibility is that of the
executive. It is set out partly in section 1 of the Courts Act
2003 which provides the Lord Chancellor is under a duty
to:
“ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to
support the carrying on of the business of the Courts of
England and Wales and that appropriate services are provided
for those courts.”
The Concordat16 also makes it clear that it is the Lord
Chancellor who is responsible for the provision and
allocation of all resources for the administration of justice,
whether the resources be financial, material or human.
However, although the provision of resources is the
responsibility of the executive, the judiciary have the
closest interest in that provision, as an independent
judiciary cannot function without them17. This is
recognised in the Concordat in the provision for the
judiciary to be “effectively involved” in the resource
planning of the Department and the agency appointed to
provide the administrative infrastructure for the courts –
Her Majesty’s Court Service (HMCS). This is to ensure, as
the Concordat states “the judiciary is enabled to have early
engagement with [HMCS] and Department at strategic
level, including issues on resource plans and bids”.
This was an important, but necessary change. When the
Lord Chancellor ceased to be a judge and Head of the
Judiciary, it was essential that the interests of the judiciary
were made clear and the engagement of the judiciary
intensified in relation to resources. The effect of the
provisions of the Concordat has already been seen in a
number of different and beneficial ways. First, as the
Concordat provided, was the appointment of a judge as a
member of the board of the Department and a judge as a
member of the board of HMCS; there has then been the
involvement of the judiciary, through working parties of
the Judges’ Council, in the Departmental Bid for the
SR2004 spending round and the consequent engagement
on targets 18.
But what has been of greater significance is the much
closer involvement of the judiciary in longer term planning
and the options of the way in which modernisation and
change is to be funded. Many strategic plans have been
devised and many promises made; what happened to some
and the role of HM Treasury were referred to by Lord
Justice Brooke in last year’s lecture19; there was the unreal
approach of saying that the judges should not worry about
the provision of finance. The change that is being brought
about is much closer involvement in understanding and
having regard to what is financially viable. It is self evident,
however, that this is premised upon the clarity of the
principle that it is ultimately for the executive to decide on
the allocation of resources and a clear understanding of the
basis on which the judiciary is engaged in this process.
(b) The provision of an administrative
infrastructure
In several countries, although it is the other branches of
government that provide the resources, the entire running
of the court system is entrusted to the judiciary or to a
body independent of the executive on which the judges are
active members. Although the Judges’ Council argued for a
similar structure in their response in 2003 to the proposals
for reform, it was accepted in the Concordat that the Lord 7





Chancellor should remain under the duty20 in the Courts
Act, to which I have referred, to provide the administrative
infrastructure.
The management of the system to support the carrying
on of the business of the courts and the provision of
services for the courts has been entrusted to HMCS as an
executive agency created under a Framework Agreement
dated April 1, 2005. The agreement places on the Chief
Executive of HMCS a duty to ensure that all of its activities
are in accordance with the Concordat and provides in
some detail for the working relationship with the judiciary.
The Lord Chief Justice must be consulted before any
change is made to the Framework21.
It is self evident that, as the executive provide the
infrastructure and the staff to enable the judiciary to carry
on the business of the courts, there has to be a close and
constructive engagement between the staff and the
judiciary at every level. I have already mentioned the origin
of the Presiding Judges; their work provided fairly long
experience at the level of the circuits of a close working
relationship. At a central level, the foundation of a
successful working relationship can be traced back to the
board on which Lord Justice Brooke served in relation to
IT; the frustrations and achievements were also described
by him in last year’s lecture. This model of participation
was followed, when as a result of a review of the court
estate by Lord Carter of Coles, it was decided to create a
National Property Board in 2002 to oversee the
management of the court estate; Lord Justice Mance was
appointed to that Board. This was followed, when a
Consumer Strategy Board was created in 2003 by the
appointment of Lord Justice Latham to that Board. The
Concordat supplied the overarching link by providing that
the Senior Presiding Judge should be a member of the
Board of HMCS.
The experience of the judges who serve on these Boards
and of the Presiding Judges is that these arrangements for
engagement are essential. May I take by way of example the
monthly meetings of the board of HMCS? Clearly there are
issues such as the terms and conditions on which the staff
are employed which are entirely for the executive and
understood to be so; however most of the issues that have
to be resolved inevitably affect the way in which the
judiciary conduct the business of the courts. The
performance of HMCS and other executive agencies
against targets, the budget, the needs of the estate and
future strategy all depend to a greater or lesser extent on
the way the business of the courts is conducted by the
judiciary. In my experience so far this involvement of the
judiciary in the governance of HMCS has been beneficial
both to the judiciary and the agency.
(c) The deployment of judges and the allocation of
cases
Assuming that adequate resources are provided and
there is a sound administrative infrastructure, the proper
conduct of the business of the courts is dependent upon
the assignment of judges to the courts and the allocation of
cases to judges for management and trial. It is in this third
aspect that the structure adopted by the judiciary is
important, but the judiciary cannot do this without
engagement with the executive.
Deployment
The assignment of judges to particular courts
(“deployment”) is of significance for two reasons. First and
most important, the business before the courts is not
constant in either volume or type of case. As judges have
different skills and different areas of knowledge, it is
necessary to keep under regular review the number and
identity of judges at particular courts to ensure that cases
can be brought to trial in proper time and in as effective a
manner as possible. Second, a judge must not be at risk of
being moved away to a distant location because a decision
made is unpopular; as far as I am aware this has never
happened in this jurisdiction, though it has elsewhere.
Prior to the Concordat, the deployment of judges in the
High Court was always effected by the Heads of Division
and the Vice-President of the Queen’s Bench Division;
though it was the Lord Chancellor who assigned judges to
Divisions and had the power to transfer judges between
divisions, there was an arrangement that permitted judges
to sit in any Division. Below the level of the High Court,
the deployment of the judges was largely arranged by the
staff of the Court Service; they agreed with each Circuit or
District Judge what his deployment was to be on
appointment and made the adjustments year to year. It was
never clear, in my experience, in what capacity they were
acting, but it seemed to be for the Lord Chancellor in his
judicial capacity, though in close consultation with the
Presiding Judges22.
The Act has declared that the deployment of the
judiciary is the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice. It
has therefore been necessary to ensure there is a proper
structure in place for the discharge of this responsibility.
With the decision taken in July 2005 to keep the size of the
High Court at its current level23 at a time of increased
demand on the time of the High Court, it has become
more important to ensure that the deployment of the High
Court is co-ordinated as closely as possible. To this end the
Vice-President of the Queen’s Bench Division has been
given a special role.
Below the level of the High Court, the Presiding Judges
have the responsibility for all deployment of Circuit and
District Judges24. Although the Act has not in substance
affected the position in the High Court, it changes the8
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position below the level of the High Court. However the
provisions of the Concordat make it clear that:
“Real and effective partnership between the Government and
the Judiciary is seen as being paramount, particularly in this
area. Therefore all significant issues should be decided after
consultation”
At the level of the Circuit and District Bench, much of
the day to day work in organising the deployment was, as I
have said, dealt with by part of the Circuit Office of HMCS.
That work will be dealt with by the Circuit Judicial
Secretariat whose primary responsibility is to the Presiding
Judges. It will be their task to consult the judges of the
courts on the circuit, the officials of HMCS and others on
the needs of, and pressures facing the courts in the circuit.
They will provide regular information to the Presiding
Judges on workload, sitting patterns, performance
pressures, judges’ preferences and to make appropriate
recommendations as to changes in deployment.
Allocation of cases
The way in which cases are managed and assigned for
trial is the second of the factors in ensuring that the
business of the court is run in such a way that cases are
heard as quickly and cheaply as possible consistent with the
just determination of each case. Many jurisdictions employ
a system of assigning cases as they are filed to individual
judges to have charge of them until they are decided; often
this is done randomly and in a way so that each judge has
a roughly equal caseload. The case load is referred to
commonly by the US term – docket.
This has not generally been the practice in this
jurisdiction. In the Commercial Court in the late 1990s an
experiment was made of assigning each case to a team of
two judges. It did not work because it did not provide the
flexibility that the system generally employed in this
jurisdiction has had. In this jurisdiction the system for the
allocation of cases is known as listing, a process of listing
determines which judge manages that case, when the case
is heard and which judge hears that case. Because the
system is central to the proper conduct of the business of
the courts, it has always been accepted that this is a judicial
function. In Attorney General’s Reference No.3 of 199925 Lord
Steyn had made clear, in the context of criminal cases, that:
“There must be fairness to all sides. In a criminal case this
requires the court to consider a triangulation of interests. It
involves taking into account the position of the accused, the
victim and his or her family, and the public.”
In the Court of Appeal and the High Court the
responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice for the allocation of
cases is discharged by the Heads of Division. Below the
level of the High Court, the responsibility is discharged
through the Presiding Judges. However, because the size
and work loads of the courts are different, the allocation of
cases in the Crown and County Courts is delegated, with
some exceptions, to the Judges in charge of each court
centre – the 75 or so Resident Judges in the Crown Courts,
the 28 or so Designated Civil Judges for the civil business
of the County Court and the 50 or so Designated Family
Judges for family business.
Since the Concordat, much has been done to ensure that
there is much greater clarity about this function,
particularly in the criminal courts. First, the roles and
responsibilities of the Resident Judges, Designated Civil
and Designated Family Judges for these and their other
functions were set out in a protocol issued in July 2004 to
ensure their role was understood.
Second, at about the same time, the Lord Chief Justice
issued, with the Lord Chancellor, the Minister of State at
the Home Office and the Attorney General, the Criminal
Case Management Framework; in his foreword the Lord
Chief Justice made clear that the judiciary would
determine the listing policy for each Crown court or
Magistrates Court area and direct, in liaison with the listing
officer, the listing so as to ensure that, as far as possible, all
cases were brought to a hearing or trial with the minimum
of delay, heard by an appropriate judge and the available
judiciary were fully and effectively deployed, consistent
with the needs of the witnesses. Constructive engagement
was also covered.
In July 2005, the Lord Chief Justice issued directions on
more detailed principles on which listing was to be effected
in the Crown and Magistrates Courts and on more detailed
mechanisms for engagement. Reference to some of the
principles to be followed in setting a policy for listing at
each court demonstrate the breadth of what must be taken
into account:
• “Meeting the needs of victims and witnesses; each of
whom may have differing needs – the young and the
vulnerable require particular attention.
• Ensuring the timely trial of cases so that justice is not
delayed.
• Providing for certainty, and/or as much advance notice
as possible, as to the trial date
• Striking a balance in the use of resources, by taking
account of:
• The efficient deployment of the judiciary in the
Crown Court, …
• The proper use of the courtrooms available at the
court.
• The provision in long cases for adequate reading
time for the judiciary.
• The facilities in the available courtrooms, …
• The desirability of timing Plea and Case
Management Hearings so that the trial advocates
can attend. 9





• The proper use of those who attend the Crown
Court as jurors.
• The need to return those sentenced to custody as
soon as possible after the sentence is passed, and to
facilitate the efficient operation of the prison escort
contract.
• Taking into account the impact of policies, targets and
initiatives of:
• Her Majesty’s Government and its agencies.
• Local Authorities, the Criminal Justice Board for
the Area, the Chief Constable or Chief Crown
Prosecutor for the Area and other local bodies”.
Clarity in these principles is necessary because the
setting of the policy at each court for the listing of criminal
cases is of such importance to the prosecution defence and
witnesses alike; in civil and family cases similar principles
apply. But the breadth of the matters to be taken into
account shows the need for engagement, particularly with
the executive.
A clear framework for that engagement was set out by
the Lord Chief Justice. One of the aspects of that
framework is a mechanism for resolving disagreements at a
local level; provision is made for reference of an unresolved
issue in the Crown Court to the Presiding Judges and, if
necessary, to the Senior Presiding Judge.
Although the overall policy at each court provides an
essential framework, each case has to be allocated to a
judge within that framework. Again since the Concordat,
much has been done to clarify that responsibility. Taking
criminal work as the example, amendments to the
Consolidated Practice Direction in May 2005 and
Guidance issued under it at the same time to Presiding and
Resident Judges made clear which types of case were to be
allocated by the Presiding Judges, which were to be
allocated by the Resident Judges and how the remainder
were to be allocated.
As the primary function of a judge is and must always
remain the trial and determination off cases, it has always
been essential to ensure that as much of the function of
listing as is possible is carried out by court staff on behalf
of the judiciary. The statement of principles issued by the
Lord Chief Justice in July 2005 and the Guidance to
Presiding and Resident Judges has also brought clarity to
this; at circuit level, the Presiding Judges are assisted in
their role by circuit listing coordinators and at all courts
there is a listing officer (with deputies at larger courts) who
carries out, under the direction of the Resident Judge (or
Designated Civil or Designated Family Judge) the day to
day operation of the policy established.
The Magistrates Courts
The position in the Magistrates Courts needs separate
consideration. First, the Courts Act 2003 abolished the
Magistrates Courts Committees which had been
responsible for the administration of the Magistrates
Courts. Second, the effect of the Concordat and the
Constitutional Reform Act will be to make the Lord Chief
Justice the President of the Magistrates Courts and
responsible, as in the other courts, for the business of the
courts.
In addition to the provision of clarity in the principles to
be applied in setting listing policy by the arrangements to
which I have referred, it was necessary to provide a
framework for constructive engagement with the
administration and others. Committees known as the
Justices Issues Groups were established in each criminal
justice area comprising Magistrates, District Judges
(Magistrates Courts), Justices Clerks and the senior official
of HMCS in that area. It was made clear, in accordance
with principle, that the responsibility for the
determination of listing policy for Magistrates Courts in
each area was that of the judicial members of this group
following the principles to which I have referred; the day
to day operation of the policy was the responsibility of the
Justices’ Clerks26.
Within many courts, including the Magistrates Courts,
cases of certain types have been listed so that they are heard
on the same day or by a judge with specialist knowledge or
experience. The most celebrated example of this was the
creation of the Commercial List by the judiciary in 1895
and its evolution into the Commercial Court. In the
Magistrates Courts it has been common to list traffic cases
together and these have been known as “traffic courts”. It
became clear that from time to time it would be suggested
either at the instance of the Magistrates or the executive or
others that lists or courts for specific types of case should
be established; one current example is the piloting in two
areas of a drugs court. To ensure that there was a process
for constructive engagement between the executive and the
judiciary at a local level, a specific protocol has been agreed
between the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor.
Features which are key to its operation are clarity in the
process, local decision making and a procedure for
reference to higher levels, if there is local disagreement.
(d) Relationships with other organisations
The way in which the business of the courts is conducted
cannot be done efficiently without engagement with users
and bodies other than HMCS and the Department of
Constitutional Affairs. In criminal justice in particular,
there has to be constructive engagement with other bodies
which are part of the executive branch of government. May
I take three examples to illustrate the need for engagement
and to show what is being achieved.
Following a recommendation made by Auld LJ in the
Report of his Review of the Criminal Courts of England
and Wales, the National Criminal Justice Board and Local
Criminal Justice Boards were established with a10
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responsibility for coordination of criminal justice policy;
the Report’s recommendation, on balance, was against
judicial membership of these boards27; consultation was
considered a better route. However, it has proved essential
that a very senior judge, the President of the Queen’s
Bench Division as Head of Criminal Justice, is a member
of the National Board. Following the recommendation of
the Report, it was initially thought that consultation with
the judiciary would also be the better route for the Local
Criminal Justice Boards. This did not prove satisfactory
and a different structure for engagement has been
developed. In the case of the majority of boards, a judge
now receives all board papers and attends meetings of the
board when matters on which he needs to speak arise. The
judge is not a member of the board, but attends as the
representative of the judiciary to the board. This
distinction was necessary because local boards are
responsible for the delivery of the plans of the executive
branch of government. Although it was not compatible
with the separation of powers and independence of the
judiciary for judges to be members, it was essential that
there should be very close engagement, through
attendance, when necessary, at the board’s meetings.
A similar arrangement was made for Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships in March 2005. These
again are bodies comprised of representatives of agencies
of the executive and have a responsibility to reduce crime
and disorder in each local government area28. It was
considered29:
“that attendance at meetings from time to time where no
issues which affect the independent position of the Magistracy
have been discussed has been valuable as a means of being
regularly informed as to the plans of local agencies in areas
which impact on criminal justice and initiatives that are being
taken. Magistrates have often found it useful to explain the
role of the Magistracy and to comment on the efficacy of the
programmes that are in use or contemplated.”
Magistrates were encouraged to attend not as members,
but as representatives of the Magistracy to these bodies
with guidelines laid down to ensure that their attendance
did not compromise their independence30:
“It has been agreed that CDRPs must conduct meetings at
which Magistrates are present on the strict understanding that
Magistrates are present to hear of the concerns of the
community in relation to the prevalence of particular kinds of
crime and the programmes that are being undertaken in the
community to make the community safer and reduce crime.
No issues which affect the judicial position of Magistrates
should be discussed. Without seeking to limit the generality of
that position,
(1) There should be no discussion of any particular case that
is before the court, or may come before the court, or has
been before the court.
(2) There should be no discussion about the identification of
Prolific and other Priority Offenders (though there can be
discussion about the programmes available).
(3) There should be no discussion of sentencing policy.”
My third example is judicial membership of the
Probation Boards established in each criminal justice area.
Judicial membership was specified in the statute which
created the boards in 200131. The boards are required to
discharge the duty of the Home Secretary to provide
probation services; to have plans that conform to the
National Plan set by the National Probation Service and
approved by Ministers; and to meet targets set by
Ministers. In March 2005, in consultation with the
National Probation Directorate, it was decided to bring
clarity to the role of the judge members of Probation
Boards. The resulting protocol made clear that there was
no incompatibility with judicial independence in
membership of the boards, because it was accepted that
probation officers owed a duty to the court to comply with
the requests of the court when sentencing. The protocol
detailed the duties of the judge and provided for the pivotal
role of the judge member in advising locally on priorities in
the event that resources were constrained. Again there was
provision for the resolution of any tensions that might
arise.
At present the Home Secretary is engaged in a
consultation process in relation to changing the status of
boards so that they can compete to provide probation
services with others; if this change is made, then plainly
judicial membership of the new body would not be
possible, but it is recognised that it will be essential for
there to be arrangements at a local level for close liaison
“which should build on the high level contact existing
through the board..”32
Conclusion on this topic
Before turning more briefly to consider the second and
third topics, I hope that it is evident from a consideration
of this topic that there is increasing clarity and
transparency in the functions, frameworks for constructive
engagement (where such did not exist) and increased
intensity in engagement. Indeed there are strong grounds
for optimism that the reform to the office of Lord
Chancellor is bringing about improvements to the way in
which the business of the courts is conducted; that the
relationship between the executive and the judiciary,
although inevitably there will be tensions, will be a very
constructive one; and that the very close relationship that
it was envisaged would continue is in fact continuing in a
strengthened and more transparent form.
APPOINTMENTS, COMPLAINTS AND
DISCIPLINE
When the Lord Chancellor was head of the judiciary and
the person responsible for the appointment of judges and 11





for the resolution of complaints against them, much was
done in a way that was informal; despite the changes that
have been brought about in the past five or so years, the
position of the Lord Chancellor enabled decisions to be
made without the need for undue formality.
Appointments
The Act has brought about a fundamental change. It
establishes a Judicial Appointments Commission and sets
out with great clarity the functions and responsibilities.
However, even though there is a separation of functions
and a separate Commission, there is a real need for close
engagement. Work is being done to ensure that this will
happen, but within the clear separation of functions33.
One of the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor under
the Concordat is to determine the overall number of
judges required for each Division, jurisdiction and Region
and the number required for each level. This is to be done
after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice. Two
examples may illustrate the engagement on this. The first
arises out of the work done by a joint Departmental and
Judicial Working Party into the better use of judicial
resources34; it was found that much more information of a
statistical and forecasting type was needed if there was to
be more accurate forecasting of the number of judges
needed for the future. The group that is devising an
improved methodology is one in which the judiciary is fully
engaged.
The second example is the protocol that has been agreed
for the procedure to be followed where a new post of a
District Judge (Magistrates Courts) is to be created. There
have in the past been occasions where tensions have
developed because there has been a difference of view as to
whether a post was needed or where the Magistracy felt
there was no need. A protocol agreed in March 2005 sets
out with clarity what is to be done at the level of the
Justices Issues Group, the need, if possible, for a joint view
between the Presiding Judges and the Regional Director
and for the ultimate decision by the Lord Chancellor.
Although the judiciary and the executive are engaged in
this way in determining what the judicial requirement is
for the future and on the basis of which the Lord
Chancellor makes a request to the Judicial Appointments
Commission for the appointment of judges, the actual
selection of those judges will be made by the Judicial
Appointments Commission.
Complaints and Discipline
The Constitutional Reform Act sets out a framework for
a new system in which there are clear roles and
responsibilities for the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief
Justice; it provides for more detailed provisions to be made
by regulation. The detail of these provisions is still in the
process of being drafted and I cannot comment on it, but
they are designed to meet the conditions to which I have
referred.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND POLICY
May I finally turn to the relationship with the executive
over legislative proposals and policy.
Legislative proposals: the Rose Committee
Under our constitution, it is axiomatic that it is for
Parliament to determine legislative policy and to enact that
policy in legislation in the manner of its choosing. It is not
the role of the judiciary to advise the government on what
its draft legislation means; nor is it the role of the judiciary
to become involved in the political debates as to the need
for or terms of proposed legislation.
However, there has always been consultation with the
judiciary over the terms of legislation which affect the
administration of the courts and the administration of
justice; during some periods consultation has been
frequent, during others, sporadic35.
The prime example of this is the work of the Rose
Committee, so named after Rose LJ, the Vice-President of
the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. This committee
was established by Lord Bingham when Lord Chief Justice.
It is a body comprising members of the senior judiciary
who scrutinise proposals for law reform in the area of
criminal justice; the essence of the work of the committee
is to use the experience of the judiciary to ensure that the
proposals are as well formulated as possible and can work
in practice36. However this highly constructive engagement
can only be carried out on the basis that there is the
clearest understanding of the roles and responsibilities and
that there is transparency. All the formal responses by the
judiciary to consultation papers are made on terms that
they can be published.
Executive policy
On Monday November 7, 2005, the Department of
Constitutional Affairs published a white paper on
supporting Magistrates to do Justice.37 The policies set out
are, of course, a matter for the executive. However to
ensure that there was a significant consensus on the broad
thrust of the policies the Department established a steering
group which included the judiciary and magistracy to
consider what was to be proposed; they were discussed and
debated in the group and there was a broad measure of
consensus. This is, in my view, a useful example of
engagement between the two branches of government.
Wales
The administration of justice is not a matter devolved to
the National Assembly for Wales, but there are issues on
which constructive engagement is necessary. The clearest is
in the sphere of family law as the National Assembly
Government is responsible for CAFCASS. Although it12
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might be said that the present structure of devolution is
not as clear as it should be, as there is clarity on the
functions of the judiciary, engagement is underway.
CONCLUSION
There will always be argument about the proper scope of
the function of courts in interpreting legislation and
developing the common law and tension resulting from
judgments given by the courts. However, it is, I hope,
evident that the reforms brought about by the
Constitutional Reform Act and the Concordat have
necessitated:
• first a strengthened structure for the governance of the
judiciary;
• second, greater clarity in the respective functions of the
judiciary and executive in their day to day relationship;
and
• third, more intense engagement.
As the relationship between the executive and the
judiciary is one that is unique and quite different to the
relationship that the executive has with any other body,
those involved must have a close understanding of the
respective responsibilities and always remember the need
for self restraint. The clarity that has been brought to the
respective responsibilities is enabling the more intense
relationship to be achieved within the context of a better
understanding of the constitutional position. The character
of the relationship that is emerging in this way is, in my
view, one that is as constructive, if not more constructive,
than the one that existed before. I therefore am optimistic
that the relationship will be a very close one. Indeed some
might characterise it as a new partnership. I therefore
expect that the relationship, though it will stand on a
constitutional basis and on structures quite different to
those which existed before the Concordat, will be one
which will ensure the better administration of justice.
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